Interests of Third Parties in Properties

Interests of Third Parties in PropertiesThe main issue arising from this worry is the doubt of establishing various interests of third parties in the two properties, and the differing procedures for doing so, given that eat on maculation is a registered fee simple title, while drinking chocolate Plot is an unregistered fee simple title. This brief go out attempt to respond the questions regarding the proposed agricultural social function only accomplishment, whether Steve has any legal interests in the properties as he yells to redeem, and in any case whether Traci has an true interest in both properties arising from the parking area law and the doctrine of constructive nonice.The first issue to be intercommunicate is whether or non the deed produced by Quentin, which outlines Vernons promise to use the land for agricultural purposes only, still has a cover charge effect upon calamus after his purchase of the land. in that location is, in that respectfore, a clai m made by Quentin that there is an existing covenant on the properties which should bind successive owners of the property. There is no evidence in the facts to suggest that the deed is procedurally invalid (i.e. that it does non comply with the evening gownity requirements of theatrical role 52(1) of legality of situation movement 1925, and section 1 of the Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) morsel 1989), so it will be assumed that the deed is valid in nature. This brief will, therefore, consider whether this deed is binding upon bill, given that it was pee-peed between Quentin and Vernon (the previous owner of the property). chthonic statutory law, the promises made in leases made by deed will parking lotly become covenants.1 The courts would normally construe the terms of the lease as covenants unless the speech communication used in the lease clearly makes that term a condition2 (i.e. the landlord would have a right to automatically bring the term of the lea se to an lay off for breach of a condition, but not for a covenant). So there is no disputing that the deed was binding upon Vernon, the previous owner, and Quentin at some point, so it is therefore incumbent upon me to advise as to whether the deed is now binding on bastard. Section 3 of the Landlord and Tenant (Covenants) Act 1995 provides that the benefit and warhead3 of all landlord and tenant covenants in the pipeline shall form part of the premises, and shall good-bye upon transfer of ownership. This transfer of covenants is pursuant to other provisions, which specifies that if the covenant is personal to another(prenominal) person then it croupenot be transferred.4 Therefore, down the stairs the new law (provided that the tenancy was granted after the introduction of this Act (1 January 1996)), the covenant will be enforceable against Peter, and thus he will have to use the causal agency for agricultural purposes only. If the lease was created before this time, it wo uld fall under the jurisdiction of the ancient (common) law. The main source of authority for this issue is Spencers Case (1583) 5 Co Rep 16a, which states that a third party (i.e. the new owner) fuck only be frame by previous covenants ifThere is privity of soil between the new owner and the tenant andThe covenant touches and concerns the premises in question.Considering these two principles, it would be clear that Peter would as well be bound by the covenant under the old law, given that Peter has a privity of estate with Quentin as his new landlord, and the proposed covenant directly relates to the property.5 Therefore, under every law, Peter would not be able to use the land for his mean skeletal systeming proposals, and moldiness therefore use the land for agricultural purposes only.The question of Steves rights to both properties is dependant upon the legality of the enter with which he claims his rights. This document is an old brown envelope, and does not claim to be a deed. Peter claims a legal interest in the land, and thus there is a requirement that this interest essentialiness be made by deed.6 However, the formal requirements for a deed differ depending upon when the deed was executed. Given it is unclear in the facts as to what the date of execution of the deed was, both scenarios will be considered. If the deed was executed prior to 31 July 1990, then there is a requirement that the deed must be write, sealed and delivered. The facts do not make clear whether the envelope was signed, however it would be reasonable to end that the document was not sealed by, at least, a red printed disperse containing the letters LS. Therefore, under the old law, the document would most likely be invalid and Peter would not be bound by it. Under the new statutory law, there are now requirements that the deed must proclaim that it is, in fact, a deed.7 It must also be signed by both parties, and also witnessed and delivered.8 The document does not cl aim to be anything more than an old brown envelope, and therefore cannot be deemed to be a deed, regardless of whether or not the other criteria are satisfied. Therefore, the proposed contract to create a legal interest for Steve in the properties is invalid, and thus he does not have a recognisable legal interest that Peter must honour.In regards to Tracis equitable interest in the land, it is enforceable under statute provided it complies with the characteristics of an equitable interest.9 Under common law regarding unregistered land, it was deemed that the occupation of the land by the wife of the owner of the legal interest will be regarded as separate from that of the husband.10 Therefore, under this common law provision, it could be argued that Vernon has had constructive notice as to Tracis equitable interests in the unregistered Umber Plot due to her crops growing in there, while also the fact that her tractor (clearly marked) is garaged in the barn on Rust Plot could also b e argued to be constructive notice to both Peter and Vernon.11 Therefore, the common law recognises that Traci has an equitable interest in both plots of land, and thus she must be considered in any negotiations.In summary, the law has appropriately intercommunicate the concerns the Peter has raised. There is no way under law that Peter can use the land for anything else but agricultural purposes, and thus cannot build his proposed housing development. Steve does not have any legal interest in either property to either garage his collection of cars, or claim a 10% stake in the crops grown on Umber Plot. Finally, the common law recognises that Traci has an interest in both plots that is not recognised as a legal interest however relief can be appropriately sourced through turning to the principles of equity.BibliographyBooksClarke, A, and Kohler, P, Property Law description and Materials (2005), London Cambridge University air pressureGray, K, and Gray, SF, Land Law (2006, 4th ed) , London Oxford University expressMacKensie, J, and Phillips, M, Textbook on Land Law (2004, 10th ed), London Oxford University PressLegislationLandlord and Tenant (Covenants) Act 1995Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1989Law of Property Act 1925Cases get-up-and-go d Henniker v Watt (1828) 8 B C 308Kingsnorth Finance Co Ltd v Tizard 1986 1 WLR 783Spencers Case (1583) 5 Co Rep 16aWilliams Glyns Bank Ltd v Boland 1981 AC 4871Footnotes1 Law of Property Act 1925, s 52.2 Doe d Henniker v Watt (1828) 8 B C 308.3 Judith-Anne MacKensie and bloody shame Phillips, Textbook on Land Law (2004, 10th ed), 213.4 Landlord and Tenant (Covenants) Act 1995, s 3(6)(a).5 settle also P A Swift Investments v Combined English Stores Group plc 1989 AC 632, 642 for further explanation regarding touch sensation and concerning.6 Law of Property Act 1925, s 52(1).7 Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1989, s 1(a).8 Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1989, s 1(b).9 Law of Property Act 1925, s 1(3).10 Kingsnorth Finance Co Ltd v Tizard 1986 1 WLR 783.11 See Williams Glyns Bank Ltd v Boland 1981 AC 487, 508 in regards to registered land and equitable interests therein.